We study two interventions for underemployed youth across five Ethiopian sites: a $300 grant to spur self-employment, and a job offer to an industrial firm. Despite significant impacts on occupational choice, income, and health in the first year, after five years we see nearly complete convergence across all groups and outcomes. Shortrun increases in productivity and earnings from the grant dissipate as recipients exit their micro-enterprises. Adverse effects of factory work on health found after one year also appear to be temporary. These results suggest that one-time and one-dimensional interventions may struggle to overcome barriers to wage-or selfemployment.
Introduction
In developing countries, such as Ethiopia, low-skilled youth often spend long periods of time underemployed or not employed at all. Young women often face steeper challenges than men and exhibit lower rates of labour force participation and higher rates of unemployment.
This paper follows a panel of young, mostly women, low-skilled job-seekers in Ethiopia over a period of five years. Our aim is to assess whether young people in this context face barriers to entry into occupations for which they would be well suited. We use two experiments to analyze whether one-time interventions can overcome impediments to entering two of the most common types of work: (i) low-skill wage work, especially in factories; and (ii) self-employment in petty business and other "microenterprises".
Between 2010 and 2013, we identified nearly 1000 people interested in an industrial job at one of five firms. The firms were in different sectors and regions, each one hiring a large batch of workers for a line expansion, sometimes multiple cohorts over time. Most of the eligible applicants were healthy but unemployed women in their early 20s, with no formal work experience and little self-employment. We introduced two experimental interventions: a cash grant intended to stimulate self-employment, and a factory job offer intended to reduce barriers to entry in wage employment. Thus, the job-seekers were assigned to either a start-up grant, the job offer, or a control group. After a baseline survey, we re-interviewed the sample after roughly 1 and 5 years, finding 85-90%.
The first intervention was a cash grant worth roughly $300, equal to about one year's income at prevailing wages. It was framed as a business start-up grant and came with a few days of training and consulting on microenterprises.
1 The grant was designed to help these young people overcome one of the most commonly cited barriers to self-employment: a lack of capital or access to credit. 2 Unemployed youth in developing countries may have opportunities in "entrepreneurial" self-employment, in agriculture or petty trades, but lack the initial capital required to start such small businesses. They may also face uncertainty about their own ability to run an enterprise and not be able to take the risk of experimenting with this kind of work. In these contexts, cash or in-kind grants could spur investment and increase long-run earnings. A number of recent studies have found that cash or other capital injections reduce poverty over horizons of mostly 1-4 years.
3 These results have bolstered a view that a lack of increases in earnings 1-5 years later (Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2012) , Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn, and Woodruff (2014) , Hussam, Rigol, and Roth (2017) ). Cash grants to poor farmers in Mali raised farm inputs and incomes after 1 and 2 years (Beaman, Karlan, Thuysbaert, and Udry (2014) ). Unconditional cash transfers in Kenyan villages led to sustained increases in assets between treatment and control villages, but no consumption impacts after 9 months and 3 years (Haushofer and Shapiro (2016, 2018) ). There is also some evidence from a Mexican national program that cash relieves important financial constraints and leads to higher income after 1-2 years (Gertler, Martinez, and Rubio (2012) , Bianchi and Bobba (2013) ). Across 7 countries, programs that give grants of livestock with basic training and temporary income support show sustained increases on the incomes and consumption of the poorest rural households four years after grants (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) , Bandiera et al. (2013 Bandiera et al. ( , 2017 ). The effects of capital injections are not universally positive, however. Fiala (2018) fails to find income effects from cash grants to existing businesses in Uganda. A cash grant programs to young men living on the streets of Monrovia and engaged in petty crime also had very short-lived impacts (less than one year) on enterprise and earnings, potentially due to the unusual instability and risk of their existence (Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan (2017) ). Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto, and Udry (2014) find that cash grants to Ghanaian farmers had no effect without insurance, also because of the constraints from imperfect insurance. 4 Ethiopia has been a growing export hub in horticulture, textiles, and leather. As countries like Ethiopia enter the early stages of industrialization, the number of low-skill industrial job opportunities have grown.
5 Empirically, a large body of observational evidence suggests that formal firms pay premium wages, especially large, foreign-owned, or exporting firms (Bernard, Robertson, & Schott, 2010; Verhoogen, 2008; Söderbom & Teal, 2004; El Badaoui, Strobl, & Walsh, 2008) .
6 Women are commonly employed in low-skill firms, and there is observational evidence that working in textile factories or other export manufacturers raises women's status in the household, their quality of life, geneity in their suitability for factory work. And a growing body of literature suggests that hiring among firms in developing countries is prone to considerable frictions and information assymetries, which may prevent firms from selecting the workers who are most likely to flourish in careers in these occupations (Abebe et al., 2018; Bassi & Nansamba, 2017; Abel, Burger, & Piraino, 2017) .
Even absent any scarcity or rents in industrial jobs, a randomized job offer might change occupational choice and earnings paths in the long run. Most of our sample was unemployed for at least a month before they entered our sample, either due to adverse shocks or because they are entering the labor market for the first time or after a spell of unemployment. A range of research in more developed labor markets suggests that market conditions and opportunities for such people matter a great deal for long term labor market prospects (Arulampalam, Gregg, & Gregory, 2001; Kroft, Lange, & Notowidigdo, 2013) . Young people and women in particular in Ethiopia may also face uncertainty about their own proclivities and abilities for industrial work, be unaware of health and other risks, or face other search and matching frictions. Because so many low-skilled people apply to the still small number of industrial firms, even well-matched individuals may never get the opportunity to enter into these occupations.
For the most part, we do not find support for the hypotheses that start-up grants lead to sustained income changes, or that industrial job offers affect long-run well-being. Over five years, we see that these young and mostly unemployed women found relatively full-time employment in a variety of wage work and microenterprises, even without the opportunity for a grant or an initial job offer. Medium-run equilibrium labor market outcomes seem unaffected by the interventions. After 5 years we see almost complete convergence in earnings, employment, and health.
These medium-run results diverge from some of the short-run results in important ways. For instance, in Blattman and Dercon (2018) , we saw evidence that the start-up grant dramatically raised short-run productivity. While those offered the grant weren't working many more hours than the control or job offer groups, their earnings were a third higher. This corresponded to nearly PPP$1 a day greater income-a huge amount considering that counterfactual earnings were only about PPP$3 (or about $1 a day at 2010 price levels and market exchange rates). After 5 years, we find that the new microenterprises and productivity boost are not sustained and that the control and start-up grant groups converge within a few years. At best, the cash acted as like a temporary boost to earnings with shortterm consumption impacts rather than a permanent lift out of poverty.
Another example is the effects of industrial work on health. Our 1-year results showed and the health of children (Kabeer, 2002; Hewett & Amin, 2000; Atkin, 2009; Getahun & Villanger, 2016) .
that those who took the factory job were more likely to report substantial health problems a year after the job offer, even though the average employee quit after a few weeks or months.
Were these health problems temporary or lasting? We returned with a battery of expanded measures, and pre-specified health as our second primary outcome after incomes. After 5 years, we see no evidence of long term adverse effects from the industrial work. Those assigned to the industrial job offer have 3 months more cumulative experience in factories than the control group, and neither reduced-form treatment effects or an instrumental variables approach suggest that this added factory work reduced health in the long run. Such longer-term results are useful for a few reasons. First, they allow us to rule out sustained or transformative impacts of the cash grants. There are few studies on the effects of cash transfers in early industrializing areas, let alone long term follow ups. Our findings are consistent with a 9-year evaluation of group cash transfers in Uganda, however (Blattman, Fiala, & Martinez, 2018) . Second, as more societies industrialize, it is also important to know whether industrial work can lead to large, chronic, and unanticipated health problems. At least in this instance, the adverse health effects seem to have been temporary.
Finally, we wanted to assess longer run impacts of the industrial job offer on income and employment. We might not expect earnings gains in industrial work after one year, because entry-level wages are so low. Even so, by fostering experimentation with a new sector, new matches, and allowing 'good' types to get a foot in the door, we may see their wages rise with tenure and from climbing up the job ladder (even if this is a minority of those assigned to the job).
Figures 1a and 1b summarize the paths of income and employment in all three arms over the 5 years, with all results deflated to 2010 Birr. The jump in weekly earnings and employment in all three groups in the first year suggests that people self-selected into the sample of job applicants because they were new labor market entrants or had suffered a shock. Likely this is both a life-cycle effect from youth increasing hours and earnings over time and perhaps rapid recovery from any adverse shocks to employment that propelled people into the sample. Note that the figure makes it seem that job offer and control group incomes are stagnating from years 1 to 4, and that the start-up grant group is converging down to their level. This is possible, and indeed we see evidence of microenterprise exit. But this is also a period of high inflation, and nominally earnings and consumption are rising. At the same time, this is a period of high inflation and the national inflation index (the only available measurement) could exaggerate the flatness of poor young people's incomes. In any case, we see no sustained effect of cash on income or consumption.
In the end, only one in six people remain in factory work, even among those randomly offered the job. From our data and qualitative work, it seems that people in all three arms used factory jobs as a safety net to smooth income temporarily until other less rigid and less risky work could be found. Altogether, these medium-run results are consistent with the simple alternative hypothesis that industrial jobs are not higher-quality and "rare" jobs, but rather are average to low quality jobs where labor markets function normally.
In the end, a main takeaway from this experiment is that two of the interventions that some schools of thought think should have large lasting effects on poverty simply do not have these impacts, at least in this setting and with young women. One interpretation is that one-off interventions and nudges addressing a single or small number of market failures may not be lasting. Powerful forces may push individuals back towards equilibrium outcomes irrespective of interventions. This is largely speculative, but if more interventions in more places fail to find long run effects of initially-successful poverty or employment interventions, it may challenge the widespread marginalist view of poverty alleviation. This could push interventions to be more multifaceted addressing multiple barriers at once, and perhaps addressing constraints at the local or macro level as well.
Setting
Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa after Nigeria, and also one of the poorest. 27 percent live under $2 a day in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, and agriculture employs 85 percent of the workforce. Like many African countries, the underdeveloped private sector has offered few formal sector jobs. Youth unemployment and underemployment are high. Most young people are engaged in informal wage work or self-employment.
At the same time, Ethiopia is also one of the fastest growing economies in the region, with GDP growth of roughly 10% per year from 2006-16. In particular, Ethiopia has become a growing export hub in horticulture, textiles, and leather. Although the economy has been moving in fits and starts through the early stages of of industrialization, Ethiopia has been touted as one of China's successors in light manufacturing (The Economist, 2014) . The country has several advantages from a manufacturer's point of view: low wages, a politically stable and foreign investment-friendly regime, a domestic market of 94 million people, and proximity to Europe.
Over the last two decades, there has been a transformation in Ethiopia's urban labor markets. They have become more flexible, with rising importance of private sector work, no obvious skill premiums between the private and public sector, and lower (but still considerable) urban unemployment. In all the firms in our study, and in general across the private sector, employers can set wages without any legal restriction or reference to union deals. The governing labor law makes it also relatively straightforward to fire an employee.
In the years prior to our study, 2000-08, national income and industrial output both grew about 10 percent per year, with the number of medium and large manufacturers doubling in number (CSA, 2011) . The beginning of the study period was first a boom time followed by a mild slow down. Even so, during this period new foreign firms were entering the market and starting small plants, and some domestic firms were continuing to invest and expand. Growth picked up later in the study period, and again Ethiopia is now one of the fastest growing economies in the region.
3 Experimental sample, procedures, and data
Experimental sample
Our sample of young people comes from job applicants to 5 industrial firms, in 5 different sectors and 4 regions of the country, both urban and rural. Two firms hired more than one cohort over the study period, 2010-13, for a total of eight cohorts. Notes: Firm data come from firm manager interviews. Applicant data come from a baseline survey, described in Section 3.4.
8 shoes, and beverages) and two in commercial agriculture (flowers and vegetables). Four were export-oriented. Only one was foreign-owned. Eligible job applicants were recruited and screened in the firms' standard fashion, described below. Only these screened applicants were eligible for one of the two treatments: an industrial job offer or the start-up grant package. Table 1 reports baseline characteristics of these screened applicants, from self-reported surveys.
7 80 percent were women. The average applicant was 22 and had completed grade 9. Most were unmarried. They had 7.5 hours of work per week, typically a portfolio of activities such as farming, casual labor, or petty business. They had earned little cash in the previous month. Only 27 percent had worked in a large, formal firm before, and only 19 percent in a factory. Based on qualitative interviews, most applicants had only a hazy idea of the type and difficulty of the work in advance, and often only learned the salary being offered at the time of hiring.
Interventions

"Start-up" grant and training
The core of the start-up treatment was an unconditional cash grant of nearly 5000 Birr, or roughly $300. (see Table 2 ). 8 We chose the $300 amount based on our qualitative assessment of the costs required to set up a small part-time enterprise. While we framed the cash grant as a business start-up fund, throughout the intervention we made clear that it was nonetheless an unconditional grant and grantees were free to use it as they saw fit-savings, consumption, or investment. To encourage and enable business start-up, however, grantees initially received five days of business training and planning.
9 Professional skills trainers led classes of about 20, and each person also received individual mentoring during those five days. 10 Subjects had to complete at least three days of the training to receive the grant.
Industrial job offer
The jobs involved working on production lines where the workers bottled water, picked and packed produce and flowers, cut fabric, or sewed shoes. They could involve heavy machinery or simple tools. In terms of eligibility, the positions required no previous work experience. Applicants had to be healthy and able-bodied. All firms also had a minimum education requirement -grade 6 in the two rural horticulture firms, and grade 8 or 10 in the more urban manufacturing ones. Most firms had separate jobs for men and women, and depending on the position they were hiring for, they would specify a gender.
The positions required 45 to 50 hours per week over 5 or 6 days. At the time of the baseline surveys, the jobs typically paid a wage of $1 to $1.50 per day at 2010 market exchange rates (where $1 = 13.5 birr in 2010). Some firms offered non-wage benefits such as on-site health care and bus transport.
The workplaces were professional and well-maintained, and firms never coerced employees. Nonetheless, health risks were common, especially: air quality (dust particles or chemical fumes); discomfort and fainting from standing or lack of breaks or water; and safety hazards such as wet floors, sharp instruments, and so forth. In interviews, workers who used cleaning solvents, pesticides, dyes and glues sometimes reported fainting from inhalation.
Most firms were unionized, but these were generally worker associations that mediated disputes but did not engage in collective bargaining. Occasionally, however, we did observe short strikes or walkouts in response to salary delays.
Recruitment
Firm recruitment and selection
We approached roughly 300 firms, about half of all private industrial firms in Ethiopia with 50 or more employees.
11 We contacted them by phone or walk-in. To be eligible for the study, a firm had to be in manufacturing or commercial farming, expect to hire a batch of at least 15 low-skill, full-time workers, and be willing to randomly assign job offers among screened applicants.
Grantees did not see this service as helpful, and given the cost it was discontinued after cohort 3. 11 We identified these firms through applications for investment certificates, public business listings, industry associations, and personal contacts.
The limiting factor was whether a firm had imminent large expansion plans. Only a handful had plans to open a entire new production line and hire a large batch of workers at once.
12 Firms with more modest expansion plans were a poor fit for the study, as they planned to hire people piecemeal, to accommodate more gradual growth and cope with regular attrition. Randomization was seldom an issue, and more than three-quarters of the firms we approached were open to the study.
13 While one might expect that firms want to select the best workers, low-skill entry-level positions were often filled without a substantive interview process. In most of the firms we approached, entry-level hiring was ad hoc in the sense firms filling low-skill positions on a first-come, first-hire manner, with little or no interview process. What are these five study firms a case of? Our data suggest the jobs are similar to other labor-intensive, low-skill, entry-level positions in the large textile, garment, footwear, beverage, and commercial farming sectors, and thus different from positions in higher-skill and heavier or more capital-intensive manufacturing. Compared to a representative sample of industrial firms in 2014 in the capital Addis Ababa, our five firms had higher revenues, lower profits, two to three times as many production employees, and lower-skilled employees.
14 It is reasonable to worry that firms willing to randomize employment were poorly managed or had unusual turnover. While possible, qualitatively we saw little difference between our firms and the others we approached. On the contrary, all were expanding employment, suggesting they had more credit and higher returns to investment than others.
Sample recruitment and selection
We followed each firms' normal procedures for hiring batches of new employees to staff new production lines. The firms advertised jobs through a posting on the front gate, word of mouth, and local job boards.
15 Applicants were instructed to gather on a specific day. Firm managers would then screen written or verbal applications, typically based on job-specific gender, education, and health requirements. Across all 8 cohorts, between 75 and 95 percent of applicants passed these criteria and thus entered the study sample. We do not have data on ineligible applicants. A research team from Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and the Ethiopian Development Research Institute (EDRI) then debriefed eligible applicants on the study, the start-up start-up arm arm, and the survey and randomization procedures. Nearly all agreed to enter the study, completed a baseline survey, and entered the lottery.
Following randomization, the firm posted the names of people receiving the job offer at the factory site and the IPA/EDRI research team contacted all those assigned to two treatment arms. Job offers began within a few days and the start-up training and grants within a few weeks.
We gave each firm a list of unsuccessful applicants and asked the firm not to hire them for at least 1-2 months. In practice, however, the firms kept poor records and within a few days or weeks of the randomization could have hired control group members.
Randomization and balance
We randomized by cohort, stratified by gender, using a uniform random variable generator. 304 were assigned to the job offer, 285 to the start-up grant arm, and 358 to the control arm. Table 2 reports tests of randomization balance, where we regress each covariate on treatment indicators plus randomization block (cohort-gender) fixed effects. This sample is somewhat imbalanced across the treatment arms at baseline. As Table 1 shows, of the 34 covariates across two treatments, 8 of the 68 mean differences (12 percent) have p < .1. Those assigned to jobs are less likely to be married and have slightly lower executive functions and education compared to the control group. Those assigned to the entrepreneurship program have lower assets and more firm experience. A test of joint significance of all covariates has a p-value of 0.04 for the job offer and 0.01 for the entrepreneurship program. To minimize bias, we control for baseline covariates when estimating treatment effects.
Outcomes
3.5.1 1-and 5-year endline data
We conducted follow-up surveys roughly 1 and 5 years after assignment to the two treatments. At each of these two endlines, we attempted to reach each respondent twice, roughly 2-3 months apart, to measure our main outcomes twice. We did so to improve statistical precision with highly-variable outcomes such as earnings or consumption (McKenzie, 2012) .
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During site visits to several dozen factories and commercial farms, we conducted informal interviews with workers and managers. At each study firm we systematically interviewed managers at every level from senior management to line managers. Research assistants also interviewed 138 workers and microenterprise owners, both in and out of the sample. They also conducted 60 exit interviews by phone with sample members who quit the study firms.
Attrition
Our sample frequently moved between survey rounds. We were able to track down 88% after 1 year and 84.3% after five.
17 Appendix Table A .1 reports the correlates of attrition after 5 years, from a simple regression of an attrition indicator on baseline covariates. After 1 year, all treatment arms were roughly as likely to be found. After 5 years, those assigned to the job offer were no more likely to be found after five years than the control group. But those assigned to the start-up arm were roughly 5 percentage points more likely to be found and interviewed. Controlling for baseline covariates, this difference is not statistically significant, but it is potentially substantively important. Thus, below, we will consider the robustness of our estimates to alternative attrition scenarios and sensitivity analysis.
Otherwise, attrition is mostly uncorrelated with baseline characteristics. The exception is marriage, as unmarried individuals at baseline are 6.5 percentage points less likely to be found after five years. Women commonly move to become married, and this may account for their loss.
Primary outcomes and dealing with multiple outcomes
Based on the 1-year findings, our pre-analysis plan for the 5-year endline pre-specified two primary outcomes of interest: income and physical health. As secondary outcomes we specified an interest in occupational choice and quality. We designated all other outcomes as exploratory.
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We divided outcomes into primary and secondary to minimize the number of hypotheses tested. To further minimize comparisons, we assembled our various measures into a family index of income and a family index of health. Our tables report treatment effects on the components of these indexes as well, but those comparisons should be regarded as exploratory. At present we have not adjusted our p-values for multiple comparisons across the two primary measures or within these indexes.
Estimation
To estimate program impacts on outcome Y , we calculate the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate of the job offer and start-up arms via OLS:
(1)
where Job and Startup are indicators for random assignment to the treatment arms. To account for observed baseline imbalance and endline attrition, we control for the baseline covariates, X, listed in Table 1 , as well as gender-cohort fixed effects, α j . Recall that at each endline we surveyed respondents in two different rounds r, collecting the same outcome two times. Each round enters the regression as a separate observation, and we cluster standard errors by individual and include a fixed effect, γ r=2 , forthe second round. Note that all outcomes are self-reported, and each treatment arm was aware of their assignment and the existence of other arms. Thus, there is the potential for self-reported outcomes to vary with treatment status. As with most low-income countries, there are no administrative data on earnings. And as with most countries, there are no systematic and available administrative data on health or informal earnings. Regression estimates are calculated with district and cohort fixed effects Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent due to having two observations per person. All observations are weighted by the inverse of their sampling probability and the inverse of their predicted probability of attrition using a Leave-One-Out logistic predictive method. Control means are also calculated using these weights. Income and employment levels Our primary economic outcome is income. We have two measures of income, pre-specified, that we combine into an income family index. One is the sum of weekly cash earnings across 22 different occupations. Earnings are seasonal and do not reflect home production, so we also consider a measure of non-durable consumption in the previous 4 weeks via an abbreviated consumption module of 82 items.
Results
Economic impacts
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In the start-up grant arm, we see a striking short-run divergence followed by convergence within 5 years. Income increases 0.16 standard deviations after one year (including a one third increase in reported earnings and a nearly 10% increase in consumption), but there is virtually no income effect after 5 years. This temporary income effect from the grant was driven mainly by increased hours of work, almost all through the channel of self-employment in retail trades. We see little difference in earnings per hour reported worked. This increase in employment also disappeared after 5 years.
In contrast, we see no evidence of an effect of a factory job offer on income or total hours of work after 1 or 5 years.
Unemployment and occupational choice Recall from Figures 1a and 1b above that both incomes and hours of employment rose steeply in the first year. They stagnated or fell, however, in the subsequent 4 years. Figure 2 looks at employment and occupational choice on the extensive margin (pre-specified as secondary outcomes of interest). The probability of being employed fell slightly between the 1 and 4 year endline. One reason is that a few young women exited the labour force. Others who are unemployed report looking for employment.
Examining trends in the control group gives insight to the life-cycle effects of occupational choice in our sample. While slightly more individuals entered self employment between the 1 and 5 year surveys, this increase in employment was counteracted by exit from factory and non-factory wage jobs.
18 See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2198 19 See Beegle, De Weerdt, Friedman, and Gibson (2012) for this approach. This abbreviated measure likely understates total consumption by excluding durable asset use and less common purchases. Note that we also pre-specified a third measure of income, an index of almost two dozen durable assets. Due to a survey programming error, however, these durables data were mistakenly not collected in the 5-year endline. The start-up grant initially had a strong effect on self employment. After 1 year, 41% of this arm were engaged in self-employment. In fact, 78% of the start-up arm attempted selfemployment at any time over five years, and most of this experimentation took place within the first year of receiving the treatment (Table 4 ). There are some lingering effects of this after 5 years. The start-up grant arm are still slightly more likely to be self-employed (not statistically significant). But the fall from 1-year levels of self-employment is precipitous, suggesting that even this occupational choice impact may be converging.
This finding runs counter to the notion that individuals in our sample would be successful in entrepreneurial work if they could only overcome barriers to starting a small business. The start-up arm induces significantly higher levels of experimentation with self-employment employment. But the large number of people who were induced to start small enterprises do not appear to have stuck with them five years later.
One of the other patterns we see across the five years of the study is rapid exit from factory work. To understand the rapid rate of exit from factory jobs, we begin with evidence from Blattman and Dercon (2018) , where we analyzed the first year of qualitative data and patterns in the panel. A few findings stand out:
• We saw no evidence of an industrial wage premium in our five firms. A simple nonexperimental wage comparison suggested that industrial jobs seemed to pay almost a Regression estimates are calculated with district and cohort fixed effects Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent due to having two observations per person. All observations are weighted by the inverse of their sampling probability and the inverse of their predicted probability of attrition using a Leave-One-Out logistic predictive method. Control means are also calculated using these weights.
quarter lower wages than informal opportunities.
• Industrial work came with more stable employment hours, though only modestly so.
Most members of the control arm were able to find full-time informal work by the time of the 1-year endline. Informal work also tended to pay higher wages than the industrial firms, but it typically came with the risk of short unemployment spells. Over the horizon of a month or a year, however, earnings in the industrial sector were no more stable than the alternatives.
• A third of people offered an industrial job quit the study firm in the first month, and 77 percent quit within the year. People generally quit the sector altogether, rather than simply switch firms. Firm managers said they found the high levels of turnover inconvenient, but were generally able to fill the positions with other low-skill workers.
• Qualitatively, our interviews suggested that young people used low-skill industrial jobs more as a safety net than a long-term job, and where self-employment and informal work were typically preferred to, and more profitable than, industrial jobs.
What do we see in the subsequent four years? First, looking again at Figure 2 , participation in factory work has declined in the control group between the 1-and 5-year endlines, falling from 18% to below 12% at the extensive margin. In other words, the high rate of exit from factory jobs continued after year 1, such that the job-offer individuals are not significantly more likely to be in factory jobs five years later.
Even though few are employed in factories at the 5-year endline, the control group continued to experiment with factory work at a similar pace as they did in the first year of the study. (As Table 4 shows, the control group had on average 2 months of factory work by the one year follow up, and 5 months by the five-year follow up.)
Even after 5 years, the job offer results in nearly 3 additional months of lifetime experience in factories -a one third increase over the control group mean. About half of this gain comes from the first year after the offer. About half comes in the subsequent 3 years (not statistically significant). The small but steady exposure of the control group to factory work bolsters the earlier interpretation that these are unpleasant jobs that our sample used as a last resort.
We also see that the start-up grant deters people from sampling factory work, to some extent. After 5 years, the start-up arm are significantly less likely to be engaged in factory work, and have only a third as many months of cumulative factory experience. We can also interpret this as consistent with unemployed workers seeking factory work as a last resort in times of need. The start-up grant had higher incomes after 1 year, allowing them to avoid factory work for a time.
Finally, we see no evidence that these spells of factory employment have effects on long term incomes or hours of work. Appendix Table A .3 reports the complier average causal effect of assignment to the job offer or start-up grant, where we use assignment to treatment as an instrument for length of time in the industrial sector. That is, we use the estimates in Table 4 as a "first stage". This instrumental variables (IV) estimate is useful for understanding whether a longer spell of past employment in the industrial sector has long term effects on outcomes such as income and employment. For instance, the spell could lead to experience, social networks, or shocks that improve or hinder future employment prospects. The instrument is weak by the 5-year endline, since the cumulative effect on months of employment has fallen to 3 months (a 33% increase). This contributes to noisy IV estimates. Nonetheless, we see nothing to suggest that employment or income prospects improve with longer spells of factory employment. If anything there is a small but noisy adverse effect on incomes and employment levels. Cost-benefit analysis Figure 3 shows the net present value of both the job offer and the start-up grant interventions. In each survey round -baseline, 1-year, and 5-year -we report the treatment effects of the interventions on earnings and linearly interpolate between them. We take the cumulative sum of such treatment effects across all 5 years and discount the sum at a 5% annualized rate. This gives us a relatively generous estimate of the net present value.
The figure shows how far the start-up grant intervention is from being a cost-effective program of poverty reduction, in comparison to its $300 grant amount and $450 total operating cost. As noted in Blattman and Dercon (2018) , the effects on earnings of the start-up grant after 1 year amounted to only 16% of the total $300 grant amount. Regression estimates are calculated with district and cohort fixed effects Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent due to having two observations per person. All observations are weighted by the inverse of their sampling probability and the inverse of their predicted probability of attrition using a Leave-One-Out logistic predictive method. Control means are also calculated using these weights.
Health impacts
One year after receiving the job offers, we found evidence of reduced health outcomes, as measured by self-reported ability to perform activities of daily life, among those who were assigned to the factory job. Did these persist?
For the long-run data collection, we collected an expanded set of health measures from the first endline survey. First, we used an expanded list of fifteen activities to improve our measurement of ability to perform activities of daily activities, ranging from 0 to 45. Second, we conducted a comprehensive questionnaire covering a list of twenty symptoms of ill health. Here respondents could report the regularity with which they experienced these physical symptoms from zero (never) to three (often), without having to be diagnosed with a particular condition. Third, we asked about four specific health conditions that are particularly common among individuals working in industrial work, namely: asthma, respiratory problems, dermatitis, and carpal tunnel. Fourth, to more accurately measure respiratory health, and verify our self-reported measures, we conducted a spirometry procedure. Here we followed guidelines from the European Respiratory Society, reported in Moore (2012) . For the main results we report on indicator for whether the spirometry test shows an abnormal reading, indicating a respiratory problem.
In the pre-analysis plan we committed to report the effect of the two treatments on these four aggregate measures. Table 5 shows these results. We find that these negative health effects do not persist. Health outcomes are not significantly different for either treatment group across a wide range of measures.
There are two possible interpretation of these findings. The first is that the maladies experienced one year after receiving the factory job offer were not chronic. The second is that the control group was exposed to hazardous factory work in the interim and have experienced the same health problems as a result. The evidence favors the first explanation.
First, in absolute terms, the sample is in good health, perhaps even slightly improved over time. Serious disability rates after 5 years are half of what they were after 1 year, suggesting many of the problems reported in the previous endline were temporary.
Second, we see no evidence that those who stayed longer in factory work have poorer health. Appendix Table A .4 reports complier average causal effects using assignment to treatment as an instrument for length of time in the industrial sector (see Table 4 ). After 1-year, these IV estimates showed serious adverse effects on health. After 5 years we see no such evidence. While it is true that the instrument is considerably weaker after 5 years, the IV estimate for physical health or serious disabilities is close to zero, and the confidence interval does not include the 1-year point estimate.
Discussion and conclusions
We report on the labor market trajectories of almost 1000 young and mostly unemployed women in Ethiopia. We also report on two interventions that many have reasonably proposed could have had large and lasting effects on long run labor market outcomes: among people appearing to queue for industrial employment, offering an entry-level factory job in a country that is just beginning to industrialize; and offering approximately one year of factory wages as a cash grant plus some business training.
We learn both from the descriptive analysis of the panel and the experiments. We find, after five years, neither intervention has any effect on the likelihood to still work that sector after 5 years, compared to the control group (although the start-up grant group were less likely to experiment with factory employment). Earnings and consumption are also no different in any of these groups. The labour market choices and outcomes for our population have roughly the same structure and earnings that the treated would have had without the intervention. This is doubly important because of the promising short-term evidence that the startup grant increased productivity and earnings by a third. Within 5 years, however, these productivity gains seem to have dissipated.
There are reasons to believe these (mostly) young women did not have high sustained returns to self-employment relative to non-industrial wage work. The businesses may simply have failed or faded away gradually over time, as the women failed to reinvest earnings in the business. It is also possible that the business was simply a form of savings and consumption smoothing in an economy where the real interest rate from cash savings is as low as -15--20% due to high inflation and the high cost of local savings institutions (which offer negative nominal interest rates). Investing in a small enterprise may simply be the most efficient way of maximizing consumption of a grant. For instance, at a real interest rate of -15%, a 5000 birr grant could be consumed completely in 5 years by spending 54 birr per month. But at a real interest rate of 5% for example (supposing this is what a business or other savings vehicle could earn), a 5000 birr grant could provide a monthly payment of 94 per month over the same period, almost double.
Plausibly, the number of constraints on entrepreneurial success in this setting meant that lifting a single, marginal constraint such as investment capital is not enough to have a lasting return for this particular group of young mainly female workers. Given that many of the microenterprises folded, we suspect that low returns to capital given other barriers is a likely factor. Of course, it is also possible that our sample -drawn from a population queuing for a factory job -are per definition not terribly representative, nor full of entrepreneurial talent. Still, evidence points to a large number of them regularly engaging in some self-employment as a temporary alternative to wage work.
Our results also bolster a view that industrial work is not particularly high-quality, and not particularly skilled and high-paying (at least at this stage of development in Ethiopia). Wages were no better than in other low-paid sectors, jobs were unpleasant and seemingly hazardous, and (most worryingly) those that spent more months in factory work reported more serious health problems after one year. Nevertheless, for some it offered another employment option seemingly worth taking, at least for some time during the five years studied.
Naturally there are limits to what we can learn from five sites and five firms. Yet the same is true of any single program evaluation. Our start-up program is comparable in many respects to a suite of anti-poverty programs that give youth start-up capital, and the industrial results speak to low-skill light industry in contexts where workers are effectively disposable to firms. This is also a reasonable description of early and middle-stage industrialization in the US, Europe, and Asia.
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